

STATE OF WISCONSIN Division of Hearings and Appeals

In the Matter of	
Office of the Inspector General, Petitioner	
vs. Respondent	DECISION Case #: FOF - 169378
Pursuant to petition filed October 13, 2015, under Wis. Admi a decision by the Office of the Inspector General to disqualif (FS) one year, a hearing was held on Tuesday, November 24,	from receiving FoodShare benefits
The issue for determination is whether the respondent commissue for determination is whether clear and convincing e Respondent committed an Intentional Program Violation (IPV	vidence has been presented that demonstrates that
There appeared at that time the following persons:	
PARTIES IN INTEREST: Petitioner:	
Office of the Inspector General Department of Health Services - OIG PO Box 309 Madison, WI 53701	
Respondent:	
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: David D. Fleming Division of Hearings and Appeals	

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The respondent (CARES # is a resident of Milwaukee County who received FoodShare benefits in that county during at least the month of June 2015.

- 2. On October 21, 2015 Petitioner sent Respondent an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice alleging that Respondent violated FoodShare program regulation by allowing purchases of items not intended for her household with her Ouest card. The amount was \$106.87.
- 3. The allegation here is based on video surveillance from a and a outside of Respondent's neighborhood that show 2 individuals, neither of whom was Respondent, using Respondent's Quest card. A purchase is made at at 4:41 PM in the amount of \$46.61 and the two individuals then 'high-five' each other. A purchase is then made at a amount of \$60.26.
- 4. The card used in the 2 transactions noted at Finding # 3 was deactivated on July 10, 2015.
- 5. Respondent did not appear for this hearing.

DISCUSSION

An intentional program violation of the FoodShare (FoodShare) program occurs when a recipient intentionally does the following:

- 1. makes a false or misleading statement, or misrepresents, conceals or withholds facts; or
- 2. commits any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any Wisconsin statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of FoodShare benefits or QUEST cards.

FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook, § 3.14.1; see also 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c) and Wis. Stat. §§ 946.92(2).

An intentional program violation can be proven by a court order, a diversion agreement entered into with the local district attorney, a waiver of a right to a hearing, or an administrative disqualification hearing, *FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook*, § 3.14.1. The petitioner can disqualify only the individual found to have committed the intentional violation; it cannot disqualify the entire household. Those disqualified on grounds involving the improper transfer of FS benefits are ineligible to participate in the FoodShare program for one year for the first violation, two years for the second violation, and permanently for the third violation. Although other family members cannot be disqualified, their monthly allotments will be reduced unless they agree to make restitution within 30 days of the date that the FS program mails a written demand letter. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b).

7 C.F.R. §273.16(e)(4) provides that the hearing shall proceed if the respondent cannot be located or fails to appear without good cause. The respondent did not appear or claim a good cause reason for not attending the hearing. Therefore, I must determine whether the respondent committed an IPV based solely on the evidence that Petitioner presented at hearing.

In order for the petitioner to establish that an FS recipient has committed an IPV, it has the burden to prove two separate elements by clear and convincing evidence. The recipient must have: 1) committed; and 2) intended to commit a program violation per 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6). In *Kuehn v. Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d 15 (1959), the court held that:

Defined in terms of quantity of proof, reasonable certitude or reasonable certainty in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence. Such certainty need not necessarily exclude the probability that the contrary conclusion may be true. In fraud cases it has been stated the preponderance of the evidence should be clear and satisfactory to indicate or sustain a greater degree of certitude. Such degree of certitude has also been defined

as being produced by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Such evidence, however, need not eliminate a reasonable doubt that the alternative or opposite conclusion may be true. ...

Kuehn, 11 Wis.2d at 26.

Wisconsin Jury Instruction – Civil 205 is also instructive. It provides:

Clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence is evidence which when weighed against that opposed to it clearly has more convincing power. It is evidence which satisfies and convinces you that "yes" should be the answer because of its greater weight and clear convincing power. "Reasonable certainty" means that you are persuaded based upon a rational consideration of the evidence. Absolute certainty is not required, but a guess is not enough to meet the burden of proof. This burden of proof is known as the "middle burden." The evidence required to meet this burden of proof must be more convincing than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence but may be less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the *McCormick* treatise states that "it has been persuasively suggested that [the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof] could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly probable." 2 *McCormick on Evidence* § 340 (John W. Strong gen. ed., 4th ed. 1992.

Thus, in order to find that an IPV was committed, the trier of fact must derive from the evidence, a firm conviction as to the existence of each of the two elements even though there may exist a reasonable doubt that the opposite is true.

In order to prove the second element, i.e., intention, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient intended to commit the IPV. The question of intent is generally one to be determined by the trier of fact. *State v. Lossman*, 118 Wis.2d 526 (1984). There is a general rule that a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural consequences of his or her own voluntary words or acts. *See, John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck*, 208 Wis. 650 (1932); 31A C.J.S. Evidence §131. Intention is a subjective state of mind to be determined upon all the facts. *Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston*, 81 Wis.2d 183 (1977). Thus, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient knew that the act or omission was a violation of the FS Program but committed the violation anyway.

I am declining to sustain the IPV alleged here. The transactions involved were at some distance from Respondent's residence and the users do 'high-five' each other after the first transaction but those events, individually or collectively, do not demonstrate that Respondent knew of or allowed the transactions at issue. The card could have been stolen by a friend or relative. Respondent might have authorized use and the purchases were for her household. There are a plethora of other possibilities. Regardless, the standard of proof is clear and convincing – a fair step above the preponderance, i.e., more likely than not, standard most often used in benefit cases. The evidence here is not clear and convincing and I am declining to impose the requested IPV sanction.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

That there is not clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed an intentional program violation.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is ORDERED

That the petition seeking to impose a one year intentional program sanction on this Respondent is dismissed.

REQUEST FOR A REHEARING ON GROUNDS OF GOOD CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR

In instances where the good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of non-receipt of the hearing notice, the respondent has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause for failure to appear. See 7 C.F.R. sec. 273.16(e)(4). Such a claim should be made in writing to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 7875, Madison, WI 53707-7875.

APPEAL TO COURT

You may also appeal this decision to Circuit Court in the county where you live. Appeals must be filed with the Court **and** served either personally or by certified mail on the Secretary of the Department of Health Services, 1 West Wilson Street, Room 651, Madison, WI 53703, **and** on those identified in this decision as "PARTIES IN INTEREST" **no more than 30 days after the date of this decision** or 30 days after a denial of a timely rehearing request (if you request one).

The process for Circuit Court Appeals may be found at Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53. A copy of the statutes may be found online or at your local library or courthouse.

Given under my hand at the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 30th day of December, 2015

\sDavid D. Fleming
Administrative Law Judge

Division of Hearings and Appeals

c: Office of the Inspector General - email
Public Assistance Collection Unit - email
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability - email
Kevin Rinka - email



State of Wisconsin\DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

Brian Hayes, Administrator Suite 201 5005 University Avenue Madison, WI 53705-5400 Telephone: (608) 266-3096 FAX: (608) 264-9885 email: DHAmail@wisconsin.gov Internet: http://dha.state.wi.us

The preceding decision was sent to the following parties on December 30, 2015.

Office of the Inspector General Public Assistance Collection Unit Division of Health Care Access and Accountability kevin.rinka@dhs.wisconsin.gov